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Introduction
The civil wars that broke out during the 1990s in the territory of former Yugoslavia are often described as Europe's deadliest conflict since World War II (WWII, hereafter) . Along with civilian casualties and disruption, the armed conflict has become infamous for the war crimes involved, including ethnic cleansing, rape and crimes against humanity. A growing body of literature has been providing evidence on the disruptive effects of military conflicts in different contexts in terms of the human capital costs of survivors and lower economic growth and development (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Justino, 2009; Akresh et al.2011) . Beyond the latter losses though, the cumulative exposure to traumatic episodes of violence may have other 'intangible' consequences on affected individuals such as long-term changes in mental health and psychological well-being.
Mental health is an important dimension of human capital with a significant impact on many aspects of human life, e.g. well-being, employment, earnings, wealth, stigma, etc. Yet, while the 'tangible' costs of wars through the impact on survivors' physical health, education and economic wealth are routinely assessed, evaluations of the psychological costs of wars, including those on mental health, are far more scarce. This paper aims at filling this gap by assessing the long-term impact of war on mental health in post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH hereafter). The Bosnian war (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) came about following the breakup of Yugoslavia and resulted in a brutal conflict between the three main ethnic groups, Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks (i.e. Bosnian Muslims), which devastated much of the country's infrastructure and took a severe toll on the whole economy (DFID, 1999) .
To assess the mental health effects of violence, we depart from the assumption that the effects are homogenous across groups or individuals and we account for the degree of individual exposure to violence, i.e. war trauma. This is done because war may have particularly traumatizing effects on those directly exposed to terror (Miller and Rasmussen 2010) . This is even more true when violence and crimes are systematically targeted against some specific groups in the population, as it is the case for ethnic conflicts in general and for the process of 'ethnic cleansing' perpetrated during the Bosnian war in particular.
Our empirical analysis is based on the BiH Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), which provides a highly reliable individual mental health measure, the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression (CES-D) scale (Radloff, 1977) . A higher CES-D score indicates more symptoms of depression (i.e., worse mental health). By matching each individual to detailed local-area (municipality) war statistics gathered the Bosnian Book of the Dead database on war-related casualties, and using survey information on a proxy for war trauma, we are able to assess the long-term impact of war on mental well-being. Our identification strategy is based on instrumental variables (IVs) estimation. We use a proxy for an individual's war trauma (i.e., recalling painful war events) which is instrumented by using arguably exogenous variation in the intensity of war violence measured by the casualty rates at the municipality level. Past research findings and the nature of the Bosnian conflict, which was driven by the desire to create ethnically homogenous geographic areas, support the validity of our identification strategy, i.e. the exogeneity of war intensity with respect to individual mental health.
We add to the existing literature by focusing on the direct link between war trauma and the mental distress of survivors, and by providing a precise assessment of the magnitude of these effects. Our paper also adds to the policy debate on the legacies of war and the optimal design of post-conflict policies for recovery.
Our IV estimates indicate that individuals who frequently recall the war are significantly more likely to suffer from worse mental health. In particular, they score approximately 1.6 standard deviations higher in the CES-D score, with higher scores meaning that an individual shows more depression symptoms. Recalling the war causes an increase in the likelihood of suffering from depression (CES-D score higher than 15) of 60 percentage points (p.p., hereafter). These effects must be interpreted as local average treatment effects (LATE), i.e., as the effects on the individuals whose recall war status is triggered by the instrument (war intensity).
Using nonlinear models, which allow for recovering average treatment effects on the treated (ATET), we obtain lower effects of recalling the war both on the CES-D score and on the probability of depression, which are one standard deviation of the CES-D score, and 50 p.p., respectively. Our results are robust to a number of sensitivity checks, which take into account 3 individual geographical mobility and allow for different treatment intensities, and show that the negative effects on mental health are not mainly mediated by physical health problems.
We further provide some evidence on the economic costs of war trauma, by estimating its effect on individual labour force participation, working hours and monthly labour incomes. Using both linear and nonlinear models, large negative effects are found on all of these outcomes.
When aggregating the forgone labour income at the national level using simple back-of-theenvelope calculations, we find that war trauma could have been responsible for a fall of 4.2% in BiH's 2001 GDP.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes earlier findings in the literature relevant for our study. Some background information on the BiH conflict is provided in Section 3. Section 4 describes the data used in our empirical analysis, and Section 5 discusses our conceptual framework and the identification strategy. The the main results of the empirical analysis are reported in Section 6, and Section 7 reports some robustness checks.
In Section 8, we estimate the labour market effects of war trauma, and make some back-of-theenvelope calculations of the total costs for the country. Section 9 summarizes the main findings and concludes.
Exposure to violence and mental health: A brief literature review
The consequences of wars have received considerable attention in the recent literature.
Studies on the countrywide impact of conflict show that affected countries and populations adjust relatively quickly and often return to their pre-conflict growth trajectories (Davis and Weinstein, 2002; Brakman et al., 2004; Miguel and Roland, 2011) . On the other hand, a growing body of research at the micro-level finds that conflict situations cause more mortality and disability than any major disease, destroy communities and families, and disrupt the development of the social and economic fabric of nations (Justino 2009 (Justino , 2012a . The effects of war include short-and long-term physical harm, as well as reduction in material and human capital (Murthy and Lakshminarayana 2006) . , for instance, examined the consequences of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war on the height of young children in Eritrea and found that children exposed to the war were shorter than the reference population by 0.42 standard deviations. Similarly, showed that individuals exposed to the Nigerian civil war at all ages between birth and adolescence exhibited reduced adult stature and that these impacts were largest in those exposed during adolescence (see also Bundervoet et al. 2009; . The educational effects of violent conflict are also substantial.
The existing literature shows that violent conflict almost always results in reductions in educational access and attainment (Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey 2006; Akresh and de Walque 2008; Swee, 2013; Justino, Leone and Salardi 2014) . Relatively minor shocks to educational access during childhood can lead to significant and long-lasting detrimental effects on individual human capital accumulation (Akbulut-Yuksel 2009; Ichino and Winter-Ebner 2004; Leon 2012) .
Comparatively much less evidence exists on the mental health effects of conflict. However, mental health is an important component of human capital supporting individual well-being and productivity. Poor mental health may entail poor labour market conditions, income losses, and higher health expenses (Miranda and Patel, 2005) . Studies of individual behaviour have documented the impact of mental health on employment, productivity and earnings (Ettner et al. 1997; Bartel and Taubam, 1986) , criminal activity (Steadman et al. 1998) , child abuse and neglect (Kelleher et al, 1994) , homelessness (Jenks, 1994) , fertility and divorce (Bartel and Taubman, 1986) , and offspring's education (Bratti and Mendola, 2014) . Emerging data from low-and middle-income countries further indicate a strong association between mental illness and low education, food insecurity, inadequate housing, poverty and financial stress (Das et al. 2008; Patel and Kleinman 2003) . In addition to these large personal costs, collective economic costs are also significant, due to higher direct health costs and indirect costs related to higher levels of unemployment together with increase in alcohol abuse, drug addiction and social exclusion. According to World Health Organization's (WHO), the cost of mental health problems is estimated to be between 3% and 4% of GNP in developed countries (WHO, 2003) .
Unipolar depressive disorders alone rank as the third leading contributor to the global burden of diseases, accounting for approximately 12% of years lived with disability (WHO's Global
Burden of Disease 2001). 1
Researchers have estimated the causal effects of war exposure on soldiers' mental health.
Their findings suggest that deployment to combat zones, exposure to enemy fire and to dead, dying, or wounded people, generally cause a decrease in mental health status and raise the 1 http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates_regional_2001/en/. risk of suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PSTD) or depression (Gade and Wenger 2011; Cesur et al. 2013) . Less evidence is available on the effects of wars on the mental health of the general population. In particular, although a number of papers report correlations between individual war exposure and mental health problems (see the review in Murthy and Akshminarayana 2006) , studies addressing causality are remarkably rare.
Two main obstacles must be overcome when investigating the mental health effects of war (see Do and Iyer, 2012) . First, there are very few surveys collecting reliable measures of mental health. Second, researchers must address endogeneity, i.e., take into account potential individual unobservable factors simultaneously affecting war victimization and mental health, and reverse causality issues when self-reported measures of war-trauma (recalling the war) like those provided in the BiH LSMS are employed. Indeed, mentally depressed individuals may be more likely to remember stressful events, including those related to war, making the effect of war on mental health appear larger than it is in reality. On the other hand, random errors in the self-reported measure (i.e. misclassification error) or the tendency to under-report war trauma to avoid the social stigma associated with mental health problems or specific war episodes (e.g., rape) could bias the OLS effect towards zero.
To address endogeneity and measurement error issues, a source of plausibly exogenous and more objective variation in an individual's degree of exposure to violence is necessary. The latter is provided in the context of veterans' mental health by random variation in deployment zones (e.g, combat vs. non-combat). When the goal is to investigate mental health in the general population, a similar approach consists of using exogenous variation in war intensity existing across geographical areas, such as the countries (Kesternich et al. 2014) or the municipalities (Do and Iyer 2012) where individuals resided during the war. Kesternich et al. (2014) found, for instance, that exposure to WWII combats increased the risk of depression for individuals aged 50 or more. Do and Iyer (2012) , instead, use the same BiH LSMS data and do not report any significant negative effect of objective measures of war intensity (casualty rates by municipality) on individual mental health (CES-D score). Two main aspects differentiate our paper from Do and Iyer's (2012) analysis. First, we only employ the 2001 wave of the LSMS, which allows us to use a more complete measure of mental health (the 14-item CES-D 6 score instead of the 7-item version, which is available in the 2003 and 2004 waves). 2 Second, while Do and Iyer (2012) estimate the average effect of war both on victims and non-victims of war trauma, we only focus on the former. 3 This is motivated by the fact that among the many mechanisms through which wars could affect mental health, such as backward-looking (memories of past traumatic events), current (e.g., a slower economic recovery associated with current lower income), or forward-looking mechanisms (less trust and willingness to cooperate after the war), the literature on natural disasters and economic crises suggests that the first type of mechanisms is the most likely to be at work (Friedman and Thomas 2008; De Mel et al. 2008 ). Unlike others, backward-looking mechanisms, though, are likely to operate differently on the victims of violence and on the non-victims. 4
The BiH conflict
BiH is historically an ethnically diverse state. In 1991, the population of BiH was ap- of BiH. Shifts in territorial control were accompanied by the execution of widespread "ethnic cleansing" in occupied areas, creating horrific scenes of refugees and concentration camps that seemed unthinkable in modern Europe. After Serb attacks on the Srebrenica "safe area" in 1995, a dual arrangement between the U.N. and NATO was established to control tactical air power in response to Serbian attacks. The conflict and partitioning displaced 1.3 million people (see Kondylis, 2010) . In December 1995 the Dayton Peace Agreement ended four years of ethnic conflict in BiH.
The Bosnian war was characterized by the use of extreme violence, carrying out purposeful policies of ethnic cleansing, mainly against civilians (Mrvić-Petrovic 2001) . In particular, the use of violence was targeted against ethnic communities with the aim of leading to their departure from areas over which the warring parties fought for control. Thus, war intensity was mainly driven by the intentions of hostile ethnic groups to create homogenous group territories such that Bosnia has become a pivotal case study for empirical research on ethnic violence in civil wars (e.g. Weidmann, 2011; Beger, 2012) . For our purpose this means that the violence of the conflict by municipality was largely uncorrelated to individual-level characteristics such as mental health or well-being.
Detailed information on war casualties is provided at the municipality level by the Bosnian Book of the Dead published by the Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo.
This database includes 97,207 names of Bosnia and Herzegovina's citizens, who were killed or were missing during the 1992-1995 war. The research findings were evaluated by an international team of experts before the results were released. According to the database, of the 97,207 documented casualties, 40% had civilian status, 90% were male, 65% were Bosniaks, 25% were Bosnian Serbs and approximately 8% were Bosnian Croats. Figure 1 reports casualty rates by municipality computed on the (1991 Census) population. Although there are some data shortcomings (e.g. information was collected by a number of sources, including individual informants, eye witnesses, close relatives, friends, neighbours, as weel as from press reports, books, NGOs, government sources, and no standardized documents were required to prove statements of the respondents), the overall quality of the database is considered high (Ball et al. individuals. 6 Questions were asked of each household member of age 15 or older, while for younger members, information was provided by parents or guardians. The survey contains detailed information on individual health status (both self-reported general health status and physical disabilities) and educational levels, along with detailed demographic characteristics of household members, household asset endowments and wealth, ethnicity, migration, and current area of residence. Crucial for our identifying strategy is the availability of retrospective information on individuals' municipality of residence before the war (see the following section).
As for mental health, the first wave (2001) includes a battery of questions that can be used to compute the CES-D scale. Despite being subjective, as the questionnaire asks individuals about their internal states and associated behaviour, this scale has been validated in the psychological literature. In particular, the CES-D scale has been subjected to a specific validation for Bosnia and Herzegovina (Kapetanovic, 2009 ). In the current study, we use the full battery of 14 items that were administered in the 2001 wave 7 (our translation of the questions in module 4.B of the Bosnian questionnaire):
(9) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel you had no energy or slowed down?' (10) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you accuse yourself of different things?
(11) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you cry easily?' (12) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel loss of appetite?' (13) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you have problems falling asleep or sleeping?' (14) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel hopeless in terms of the future?' (15) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel sad (melancholic)?' (16) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel lonely?' (17) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you think of ending your life?' (18) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel like you were captured or trapped?' (19) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel that you worried too much about different things?' (20) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel that you had no interest in things about yourself?' (21) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel that everything was an effort?' (22) 'How often in the past week, including today, did you feel worthless?'
The possible answers are 'Not at all', 'A little', 'Quite a bit', and 'Extremely often', which are assigned scores of 0, 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Scores on single questions are then summed to obtain an aggregate score ranging between a minimum of 0 (no depression symptoms) and a maximum of 42 (very severe depression symptoms). Higher CES-D scores indicate worse mental health. On a 20-item (60-point) scale, the cut-off score of 16 is generally considered as indicative of 'significant' depressive symptomatology. In the analysis that follows, the score of the 14-item scale was converted into the 60-point scale. 8
The 2001 of BiH LSMS also includes the following question: 'During the previous week, including today, how many times did you constantly recall the most painful events you experienced during the war?' The possible answers are defined on the Likert scale described above.
In 2001, 49% of the individuals age 16 or older answered 'Not at all'; 28.7% 'A little'; 14.75% 'Quite a bit'; and 7.6% 'Extremely often'. In the current paper, we consider as victims of war trauma individuals who answered 'Quite a bit' or 'Extremely often', and for brevity, we will refer to these individuals at to those 'recalling the war'. Table 1 reports the means of the CES-D score and depression by war trauma status and their differences, split by gender and ethnicity. All differences by recall war status are statistically significant at the 1% level, and in particular, individuals recalling the war have worse mental health. In the sample, individuals exposed to war trauma are 40 p.p. more likely to suffer from depression. The differences in means are very similar by gender (with a slightly larger effect on depression for women), and by ethnic group, with slightly larger differences for 'other' ethnicity, which represents a small minority of the population. For this reason, in what follows, we will report regressions pooling men and women, and we impose a common effect of the treatment (war trauma) across the different ethnic groups.
The same positive association between worse mental health and war trauma is also clear in Figure 2 , which plots the whole distributions of the CES-D score for individuals recalling the war and for those not doing so. 
Conceptual framework and empirical strategy
We are interested in the effect of war trauma on individual mental health in the aftermath of the BiH conflict. War trauma is defined as a situation in which an individual recalls painful events related to the war. As we mentioned above, the BiH LSMS does not ask direct questions about war victimization, but includes one about recalling the war. 9 The possible answers are: not at all; a little; quite a bit; extremely often. For the purpose of our analysis, the last two answers are grouped into a dichotomous indicator, which will be referred to as 'recalling the war' (RW for brevity), and is our proxy of war trauma. 10
The main elements of our conceptual framework are shown in Figure 3 . ε i and u i are the individual unobservables affecting mental health (H i ) and war trauma (RW i ), which might be mutually correlated and cause an endogeneity problem. War intensity in individual i's municipality m of residence before the war (W I m ) increases his/her likelihood of suffering from a 9 Our proxy of war trauma differs from that used by Bellows and Miguel (2009) which refers to killings, injuries or refugee experiences of household members. 
Note. i, m and M are the individual, the pre-war municipality (of residence) and the current municipality (of residence) subscripts, respectively. war trauma. This is the exogenous source of variation (instrument) that we use to identify the causal effect of war trauma on mental health. War trauma negatively affects an individual's mental health, i.e. the direct effect of war trauma on mental health (pathway b). War trauma also has an indirect effect (pathway d) on mental health which is mediated by the individual's socio-economic status (SES, P i ). Indeed, war trauma may reduce the individual's productivity in the labour market, and, in this way, also affect her employment opportunities and wage (indirect effect of war trauma, pathway cd). War intensity also has an 'aggregated' effect on mental health, which is not mediated by war trauma (pathway f). Indeed, physical capital losses affect the level of development of the area in which the individual currently resides (L M ), and also her SES, e.g. via the likelihood that she finds a job or her income level. Notice that mental health may have a feedback effect on individual SES for reasons that are unrelated to the war (reverse causality, the dotted pathway h). IVs identification strategy, and helps derive our empirical specification. On the one hand, to use war intensity as an instrument for war trauma and to comply with the exclusion restriction assumption (i.e. war intensity only affects mental health through war trauma), in the mental healht equation, we need to control for all potential non-trauma effects of the war. In particular, it would be important to control for the individual's SES. However, controlling for the SES poses two problems. First, SES would capture part of the trauma effect of the war (pathway c). 11 Second, SES is potentially affected by mental health (pathway h) and is therefore an endogenous regressor. Mentally vulnerable individuals, for instance, are less likely to work.
The inclusion of endogenous regressors would undermine our identification strategy. Thus we adopt the following identifying strategy. To block all direct pathways going from war intensity towards mental health, we control for (aggregated) average post-war municipalities' economic characteristics instead of an individual's post-war SES. We argue the individual unobservables' contributions to the aggregate variables is averaged out taking the mean, so as these variables are likely to capture well the non-trauma effects of war intensity (i.e., physical capital loss) and to be exogenous, i.e., uncorrelated with an individual's mental vulnerability. 12 This strategy will allow us only to estimate the partial causal effect of war on mental health (that running through war trauma) and not the total effect of the war. This idea is described in further details in what follows.
Our conceptual framework can also be formally described by introducing the individual's mental health equation. Let us define as H i the stock of mental health of individual i who lived before the war in municipality m and is currently living in municipality M. Accordingly, we specify the following production function f (.) for the current stock of mental health
where RW i (recalling the war, i.e. our proxy of war trauma) and L M are both a function of war intensity W I m . X i is a vector of personal characteristics not affected by war intensity, 13 such as gender and age, and ε i an idiosyncratic unobservable factor (e.g., mental vulnerability).
The total effect of war on mental health is therefore
non-trauma effects of war (C) . (2) In equation (2) we can distinguish between three effects of the war on mental health. The first effect is the direct effect of war trauma (A), i.e., the consequences of direct exposure to war-related violence. This is the effect that is not mediated by individual SES. A second effect is the indirect effect of war trauma, mediated by individual SES, e.g., by lower labour market productivity (B). The last effect (C) is that related to other "stressors", which although being affected by the war, do not originate from war-trauma, e.g., the stressful social and material conditions that are often caused or exacerbated by destruction caused by armed conflict (e.g., lower income owing to lower economic development). This distinction roughly corresponds to the distinction between trauma-focused research and the psychosocial model made by Miller and Rasmussen (2010) . Controlling for the input L M in the mental health production function (i.e., including these variables in a regression framework), one aims at isolating the effect of war trauma on mental health. In the current paper, by focusing on the effect of recalling the war on mental health and omitting individual SES characteristics, 14 we estimate the effect
∂ RW i . This is a major difference with respect to Do and Iyer (2012) , which do not focus on recalling the war in equation (1) but directly on the effect of war intensity (W I m ) on mental health, controlling for individual SES and excluding therefore all effects mediated by the latter. Thus, they estimate the parameter ∂ f ∂ RW i ∂ RW i ∂W I m , which is the combined effect of the direct effect of war trauma on mental health and of the rise in the probability of being traumatized owing to higher war intensity. To put it in other words, we focus on the average mental health effects of war on the victims of war trauma while Do and Iyer (2012) on the average effect in the whole population, including the non-victims.
Identification strategy
We consider war trauma as the "treatment" to which individuals are exposed, and we are interested in assessing its effect on individual mental health. Because unobservable factors may make some individuals more likely to recall the war and suffer from mental health problems 14 We already said that if they are affected by war trauma, they are likely to be endogenous.
(e.g., mental vulnerability), or because the latter may influence the former (reverse causality), we need a source of potentially exogenous variation in treatment intensity. To this aim, we use data on war intensity at the geographical level (municipality) gathered by the Bosnian Book of the Dead (see Section 3). More formally, our IVs identification strategy can be illustrated using two equations. The first equation is the mental health equation
where C imM = (L m , L M , X i ) a vector of personal and municipality-level controls (some of which may be affected by the war), ε i is an idiosyncratic error term, and the α's are the parameters to be estimated. With respect to the conceptual framework in Figure 3 , we further include a vector of pre-war municipality controls (L m ) to control for factors that might influence both the degree of violence of the war and individual mental health (see the following section).
The other variables are as defined above. In particular, we take RW i as a proxy of individual war trauma, i.e., of how closely and intensively an individual was involved in war-related violence.
One thing is worth noting in equation (3), because the CES-D score is higher for those having worse mental health, we expect a positive coefficient on RW i , i.e. α 1 > 0 implies a negative effect of war trauma on mental health.
A problem with estimating equation (3) is that individuals with worse (latent) mental health (i.e. more mentally vulnerable) may also be more likely to recall all painful events, including those related to war (see, for instance, Neuner, 2010) , generating a reverse causality problem.
To address this issue, and other issues related to the potential endogeneity of recalling the war (i.e., the correlation between the unobservables entering the error term of the mental health equation and RW i ), we need a source of exogenous variation in RW to identify α 1 . We argue that this source of variation can be provided by the interaction between objective measures of war intensity at the geographical level and individual ethnicity. Thus, the second equation, for recalling the war, is defined as
where ethnic j i is a dichotomous indicator for individual i being of ethnicity j, and u i an error term. Information needed to compute war intensity (i.e., the total number of casualties for the period of the war) is taken from the Bosnian Book of the Dead and matched to the LSMS on the basis of an individual's residence just before the war, i.e., in April 1992, which is provided by the survey. 15 It is worth noting that the number of casualties for the whole duration of the war is imputed to individuals according to their pre-war municipality of residence. First, casualties by year of death are not available. Second, although when imputed according to prewar residence war intensity has the disadvantage of being less precise for movers (potentially affecting the strength of the instrument), but it has nonetheless the advantage of being 'more exogenous', that is, less related to the decision to migrate, which is likely to depend on the intensity of the conflict (see Kondylis, 2010) . The interaction terms with ethnicity are used because war victimization was not evenly distributed across ethnic groups, with most victims being Bosniaks.
Our instrumental variables, namely, war intensity (which captures the effect of war intensity on the excluded ethnicity group) and the war intensity-ethnicity interactions, must satisfy the usual three conditions. The first one is exogeneity of the instruments with respect to mental health (i.e., they must be uncorrelated with ε i ). As for the first component of the instruments, i.e. war intensity (W I m ), the Bosnian war was mainly a racial war (see the discussion in Kondylis 2010 and Section 3), and we have no reason to expect that violence was especially targeted at individuals with poor mental health. In particular, violence was perpetrated against other ethnic communities with the aim of leading to their departure and creating ethnically homogenous territories. Weidmann (2011) reports war intensity to be mainly predicted by the ethnic composition of the local population and the distance to the Croat and Serbian borders, and is unrelated with potential correlates of mental health such as the level of percapita GDP before the war. This is also evident in Figure 1 where casualty rates are higher closer to the Serbian border. A potential threat to our identification is that war intensity might, in reality, capture latent higher conflict already present in a municipality, which may also affect mental health. For this reason we have included in the recall war equation the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index computed from the 1991 population census, which is aimed to control for the latent lack of trust and greater conflict that might prevail in more culturally diverse environments (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) . As for the second component of the instruments, i.e. ethnicity, a potential threat to identification could be generated by some ethic groups being more targeted by violence and more prone to worse mental health at the same time. For this reason, ethnicity is controlled for in the mental health equation. 16 The second requirement for the instruments is the exclusion restriction assumption. In our case, this means that war intensity should not have a direct effect on mental health after the conflict over and above war trauma. Provided that an individual's income and labour force status are important correlates of mental health, war intensity might have had a long-lasting effect through these mediating variables (see Miller and Rasmussen, 2010) . 17 In this case, it could be not war trauma per se but the underdevelopment of municipalities that suffered more intense destruction causing worse mental health. 18 As we anticipated, to corroborate the exclusion restriction assumption, we include in the regressions average municipality-level economic characteristics in the current municipality of residence (the term (C) in equation eq:effect).
The third requirement of the instrument is its relevance: the instruments must be economically and statistically significant predictors of our proxy of war trauma (RW i ). Evidence supporting the instruments' relevance is provided in the following section. 16 Like other papers on the effect of the war (Do et al. 2008 , Bellows and Miguel, 2009 , Do and Iyer 2012 , our analysis is also subject to a triple form of sample selection. Indeed, individuals have to satisfy three selection criteria to be observed in the survey sample: they must have survived during the war; they must have survived during the post-war period, until 2001; and they have to have lived in BiH in 2001. We already argued that the first type of selection is unlikely to have produced a selected sample in terms of mental health. As to the second, one could put forward that if the war had a negative effect on mental health, we should expect relatively healthier individuals to have survived until 2001 (e.g., severely depressed individuals may have made suicide), and our estimates could be interpreted as lower bounds. (Remember that a positive coefficient on recalling the war in equation (3 means worse mental health.) Concerning the third type of selection, on migration, Begin and Mcdonald (2006) found that Bosnian refugees in the US reported significantly greater levels of PTSD than members of their Bosnian resident cohort, but not greater levels of anxiety or depression. Hunt and Gakenyi (2005) , comparing Bosnian refugees in the UK with Bosnian residents, also found a higher incidence of traumatic symptoms in the former and concluded that there may be more serious long-term psychological problems in people who are forced to leave their country during wartime. Thus, from the existing evidence, we also put forward that the last form of selection is likely to introduce a negative bias in our estimates, making the estimated positive effect of the war on depression smaller than the true effect. 17 Physical capital recovery, however, could be fast. See, for instance, Miguel and Roland (2011) and Waldinger (2012).
Main results
We consider two main indicators of mental health, the CES-D score and a dichotomous version of it, which takes the value of one in case the CES-D score is at least 16 and zero otherwise (for brevity we label this variable as 'depression'). 19 In spite of the discrete bounded (between zero and 60) nature of the first indicator and the dichotomous nature of the second, in this section we use linear models for both. The same is done for the endogenous treatment (recall war) equation. Linear models have become quite popular among applied economists (see Angrist and Pishke, 2009 ) and have a number of convenient features. First, they do not require using a specific distribution for the error term in the mental health and recall war equations.
The advantages are even larger when one is interested in the effect of an endogenous treatment, because instrumental variables can be used. Unlike non-linear models, to deliver consistent estimates of the regression's coefficients, linear models do not require, in our specific case, both the mental health and the endogenous (treatment) dummy equations to be correctly specified.
Hence, they are 'true' instrumental variable estimators (Lewbel et al., 2012 ). Yet linear models also have a number of less convenient features when they are applied to dichotomous variables. Horrace and Oaxaca (2006) showed, for instance, that the Linear Probability Model (LPM) is inconsistent when the linear predictions fall outside the unit interval (i.e., predicted probabilities are less than zero or greater than one). These and other issues will be addressed in the following section.
As we mentioned above, both the recall war and the mental health equations include individual variables and municipality-level controls that might be simultaneously correlated with the violence of the conflict and the socio-economic conditions associated with mental health of the local population. Namely, we included gender, a quadratic in age, ethnicity, highest educational qualification attained, and the characteristics of the municipality of residence (urban or rural). At the pre-war municipality level, we controlled for the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF) index computed from the 1991 population census. The former is aimed to control for the latent lack of trust and greater conflict that might prevail in more culturally diverse environments (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) , potentially affecting both the onset and intensity of conflict and latent individual mental health. To control for local economy characteristics (and 19 As we mentioned, 16 is the cut-off point generally considered as indicative of being at risk of depression. 20 to preserve the exclusion restriction assumption, i.e., to account for the non-trauma effects of the war) we further include the average monthly wage and the unemployment rate of the current municipality of residence in all regressions. 20 Table 2 reports main results, both OLS estimates as a benchmark and IV-GMM results. OLS estimates of the CES-D score equation are reported in column 1, and those of the depression equation in column 2 of Table 2 . Recalling the war is associated with a 9.7 points (t = 14.1) increase in the CES-D score (i.e. one standard deviation) and a 33.2 (t = 13.1) p.p. rise in the probability of depression. Other factors turn out to be significantly associated with mental health such as gender (women have worse mental health) and education (highly educated individuals have better mental health status, but the effect is non-monotonic). Table 2 report the IV-GMM estimates of the mental health and the depression equations, respectively. The F−statistic of the excluded instruments in the first-stage is 24.9, showing no sign of a weak instruments problem. Individuals who resided just before the war in municipalities characterized by higher war casualty rates are significantly more likely to recall the war. In particular, from the first stage (in Table A .2 in the Appendix), a 1 p.p. increase in the war casualty rate causes a 1.8 p.p. (t = 3.7) rise in the likelihood of recalling the war, and the effect is not different for Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats (the only statistically significant interaction term is that related with 'other ethnicity', which is positive). The Hansen-J statistic of over-identification always supports the instruments' validity. In the second stage, recalling the war is estimated to increase the CES-D score by 16.2 points (z = 5.13) and the probability of depression by 59.8 p.p. (z = 3.8). The estimated effects are relatively large, e.g., recalling the war has a CES-D score effect that is approximately 8 times that of lowering the educational achievement of an individual from the non-university post-secondary 21 to the primary level, and recalling the war has an effect on the probability of depression that is approximately 7.5 times as large as the gender gap. 22 and 63 p.p. (z = 6.23) in the CES-D score and the depression 20 We do not include current municipality of residence fixed effects when working with cross-section data because the effect of recalling the war on mental health would only be identified by non-returning migrants. On this specific point, see the following section. 21 In BiH, education at the tertiary level is two to three years in duration at visa skola and visoka skola (postsecondary, non-university institutions) and four to six years at universities. 22 We also estimated IV-GMM models not controlling for education. The latter may be indeed potentially affected by war trauma (Swee, 2013) , and including it could make our estimated causal effects on mental health more 'partial' (i.e. excluding the effect mediated by education). The estimated coefficients on war trauma in these models are 16.9 (z = 5.89 Overall, IV-GMM estimated effects are larger in magnitude than OLS estimates. This is so because, on the one hand, OLS results may be upward biased because of endogeneity 23 (i.e. mentally vulnerable people tend to recall war more frequently), but on the other hand, misreporting in recalling the war (misclassification error) is likely to produce a downward bias in the estimated effects (Lewbel, 2007) , i.e., a bias towards zero. IVs, which address both the abovementioned sources of bias, seem to suggest that the latter is the most relevant bias. Moreover, the usual Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) interpretation may also explain the larger magnitude of the IVs estimates, i.e. compliers with the war-intensity instrument (individuals whose recall war status is triggered by war intensity) may be a peculiar sub-population that is especially sensitive to mental health issues, for instance. Last but not least, it may be the case that using a linear model for dichotomous dependent variables affects the magnitude of the estimated effects. We make an attempt to address this and related issues in the next section.
Columns 3 and 4 of

Robustness checks
In this section, we check the robustness of our main results by adding more controls in the regressions, and by using nonlinear models.
Geographical mobility. A first potential issue with our analysis is the role played by movers.
In the estimated specifications reported above, we do not include current-municipality fixed effects (FEs) because upon their inclusion, the causal effect of recalling the war would be identified by permanent movers only, i.e., by individuals whose current and pre-war municipality of residence does not change. 24 Thus, in the previous section, we identify the mental health effect by using both movers and non-movers. Here, though, we check the robustness of our IV-GMM estimates to the inclusion of current-municipality FEs. Movers and non-movers may be very different sub-populations, and it is difficult to predict whether the effects of recalling the war are larger for the former or the latter. In our estimation sample, 53% of individuals are movers.
If movers are those who suffer the most from war-related violence, for instance, we might expect larger effects of recalling the war on them. Interestingly, this is not the case. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 report the estimates of recalling the war on the CES-D score and depression obtained with IV-GMM controlling for current municipality FEs. The estimated effects are in line with those reported in Table 2 , namely, 15.7 points (t = 5.7) and 54 p.p. (t = 5.5) on the CES-D score and depression, respectively. Our analysis may provide an additional explanation for the strong negative effects of war-induced displacement on individual labour market outcomes found by Kondylis (2010) : individuals who migrated because of high war intensity are also more likely to have worse mental health. 25
Physical health. Up to now, we have focused our analysis on mental health. A possible reason why individuals constantly recall the war, though, is that they suffered physical harm, which still persists and has a feedback effect on their current mental condition. This channel of influence would imply very different policies to address individuals' mental health problems, centred on physical rather than on mental therapy. We investigate this potential channel by including among the controls the number of days with limitations in Activities of Daily Living (ADL) during the last 4 weeks, as a proxy of physical health status. 26 Physical health, in this way, is just another psychosocial stressor and a potential mediating factor that might affect mental health. After controlling for it, we only focus on the effect of war mental traumas on mental health. The results are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 . The estimated effects of recalling the war increase, with 17.7 points (t = 6) on the CES-D score and 62.5 p.p. (t = 6.2) regarding the probability of depression. Interestingly, each day an individual spends with ADL limitations is associated with a 0.35 points (t = 5.9) increase in the CES-D score and a 1.2 p.p. (t = 6.2) rise in the likelihood of being depressed. When using an indicator for having a chronic disease instead of the number of days with ADL limitations, the estimated effects are 12.7 points (t = 3.2) on the CES-D score and 53.7 p.p. (t = 4.8) on depression. In both cases the instruments are not weak, and the Hansen-J statistic confirms their validity. 27 Overall, this evidence suggests that although physical conditions strongly affect an individual's mental health status, they are not the main channel through which recalling the war reduces individual mental well-being. 25 In her analysis, Kondylis (2010) uses municipality-level war intensity as an instrument for geographical displacement, and includes controls for individuals' physical health but not for mental health problems. 26 The exact wording of the question is 'How many days in the previous 4 weeks you did not perform the usual activities due to illness ?' 27 The complete results of these estimates are not shown in the table and are available upon request. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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(a) Answer to the question: "During previous week, including today, how many times did constantly recall most painful events you experienced during the war?". Recall war takes on value one if individuals answered 'quite a bit' or 'extremely often' and zero otherwise.
(b) Weak instruments' robust inference test.
(c) Two observations are dropped from the sample because days with ADL limitations are missing. Note. The excluded instruments are the casualty rate in the pre-war municipality of residence of the individual and its interactions with ethnicity dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the pre-war municipality of residence level (94 clusters).
War and physical capital destruction. As we have discussed at length in Section 5.1, to ensure the validity of the exclusion restriction assumption, we have included in the mental health and depression equations current-municipality controls, which are likely to capture the direct effect of war intensity on local economic development, and through this, on an individual's mental health. However, we also checked the robustness of our results to an alternative way of accounting for the direct effects of war intensity running through physical capital destruction. In particular, we re-estimated the specifications in columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 Nonlinear models. Using linear models to model non-linear outcomes may affect the consistency of the estimates. In particular, linearity is likely to have a bearing on the magnitude of the estimated effects. 29 For this reason, we further check the sensitivity of our estimates to using non-linear models. We use an endogenous treatment regression model, in which the CES-D score is modelled as linear and the recall war equation as a probit model (endogenous treatment regression). We also use a bivariate probit (more precisely, an endogenous treatment probit, ET-Probit hereafter) model for depression, in which both the recall war and the depression equations are modelled as probit. On the one hand, both these models rely on joint normality and on much stronger identifying assumption than those reported in the previous section. On the other hand, the additional distributional assumptions, if correct, are likely to greatly increase the estimates' precision (i.e., to increase efficiency), and, unlike linear IVs, allows us to obtain other parameters of interest such as Average Treatment Effects (ATE) and
Average Treatment Effects on the Treated (ATET).
Column 1 of Table 4 reports the estimates of the endogenous treatment regression model for the CES-D score. The excluded 'instruments' are highly statistically significant in the recall 28 The full set of estimates is not reported in the paper for the sake of brevity, and is available upon request from the corresponding author. 29 Lewbel et al. (2012) give examples in which even the sign of the estimated effects may be wrong, and researchers can get significant negative effects when the true treatment effects of interest are instead positive. (1) (2) ET-regression (b) ET-probit (b) CES-D score Depression *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(b) ET stands for 'Endogenous Treatment'. In the Table the coefficient on recall war status, which corresponds both to the ATE and the ATET, is reported in column (1). In column (2), the ATE is computed as the the average partial effect (APE) on the estimation sample, and the ATT as the APE on the sample of individuals for whom war recall status equals one.
(c) Correlation coefficient between the errors in the mental health and the recall war equations. Note. The 'excluded instruments' are the casualty rate in the pre-war municipality of residence of the individual and its interactions with ethnicity dummies. All models include the same controls as in the linear models of Table  2 . Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered at the pre-war municipality of residence level (94 clusters) in column (2), and clustered by pre-war municipality in column (1).
war equation (χ 2 (5) = 47.7). 30 The estimated ATE of recalling the war on the CES-D score is 10.7 (z = 12.8), lower than that obtained with IV-GMM estimation in Table 2 . Interestingly, the estimated correlation between the error terms in the CES-D score and the recall war equations is negative (-0.08) and statistically significant, suggesting that latent unobserved traits that make individuals more likely to recall the war are negatively correlated with those worsening their mental health status (as a higher CES-D score means less mental well-being). This negative correlation is consistent with the downward bias found in the OLS estimates when compared to the IV-GMM estimates. A possible explanation is that individuals who are more mentally vulnerable may tend not to report remembering the war as a self-protection mechanism, generating false negatives in the treatment status. Column 2 shows the estimates of the ET-probit model. In this case as well, the excluded variables used to identify the model are highly statistically significant in the first stage (χ 2 (5) = 52.6), and the estimated correlation between the error terms is negative but insignificant (-0.28). The estimated ATE of recalling the war on the probability of depression is 30.8 p.p. (z = 5.5), 31 smaller than the one obtained with IV-GMM in the LPM (62.5 p.p.). However, when marginal effects are computed only on the treated individuals (ATET), the estimates are much closer to those obtained with IV-GMM.
The estimated ATET is indeed 50.4 p.p. (z = 5.5). Overall, these results suggest that the effects on the treated are larger than those on the overall population and that this is partly responsible for the large magnitude of the IV-GMM estimates.
It must be kept in mind, though, that the ET-probit model (i.e., practically a bivariate probit model, BP hereafter) may be inconsistent in case the true data-generating process is not jointly normal, and for this reason Chiburis et al. (2012) recommend running the Rao score test (Murphy, 2007) to detect when the BP model is misspecified, and hence BP estimation is inconsistent. The value of the score test for the model in column 2 of To give an answer to this question, we estimated a linear regression joint with an ordered probit for the CES-D score and a probit model joint with an ordered probit for the likelihood of depression. 32 In this case, we used the same set of controls as in Table 2 , and the results are shown in tively. The ATETs for the same treatments are 12.5 p.p., 32.5 p.p. and 57 p.p., respectively, and are always statistically significant at the 1% level.
The economic burden of war trauma
As shown in the previous section, war victimization has long-lasting negative effects on individual mental health. In this section, we make an attempt to quantify some of the economic burdens of war trauma. There are different types of costs for individuals or firms at a microeconomic level and for the society as a whole at a macro-level. (WHO 2009 *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(b) ATE is computed as the average partial effect (APE) in the estimation sample. ATET is computed as the APE computed only on the sample of individuals for which each specific treatment is equal to one. Note. The excluded instruments are the casualty rate in the pre-war municipality of residence of the individual and its interactions with ethnicity dummies. All models include the same controls as in the linear models of Table  2 . The model in column 1 is an ordered probit (recall the war) jointly estimated with a linear equation (CES-D score). The model in column 2 is an ordered probit (recall the war) jointly estimated with a probit (depression). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the pre-war municipality of residence level.
household members (who may react to an individual's reduced health with various coping mechanisms), the effects on human, physical and financial capital accumulation, non-market impacts (e.g., leisure) and other economic welfare losses. Many of these components are very difficult to quantify. The part of these costs that is probably easier to estimate using microdata is the labour market effect of a particular health condition. WHO (2009) recommends the use of the output-related approach (Goldschmidt-Clermont, 1987) , which aims at isolating only the fraction of market production lost by an individual due to a specific health condition, by making comparisons between individuals with and without such a condition.
In particular, in the current paper, we are not interested in the economic burden of mental illness and depression per se (see, for instance, Das et al. 2008 ), but only in that caused by war trauma. In what follows, therefore, we measure the (potentially negative) effects that recalling the war has on an individual's labour force participation status, weekly working hours and net monthly income. When evaluating these effects, it should be noted that they may be an upper bound of the corresponding costs for households, which may use several coping mechanisms to alleviate the negative consequences produced by the onset of a negative health shock to one of its members (e.g., other household members may increase their labour supply in response to the reduced working capacity of the ill member). However, it is also true that some of these coping mechanisms are only temporary (WHO, 2009), may not prevent more negative consequences in the long run (e.g., reduced investment in children's human capital) and that, in principle, negative spillovers on other healthy family members are also possible (e.g., healthy members might need to take care of the ill member and withdraw from the labour market).
In this section, we estimate the labour market effects of war victimization by both using linear IV-GMM and nonlinear models, focusing on the ATET in this latter case. We start from the latter, which are reported in panel A of Table 6 . All models include the controls used in Table 2 and the number of days with ADL limitations as a proxy of an individual's physical health, which is likely to negatively affect labour market outcomes. Column 1 uses an ET-probit model and shows that recalling the war reduces the probability of labour force participation by approximately 23 p.p. (z = −8.9). This is a very large effect, given that the average probability of participating in the labour market is 55% in the estimation sample for individuals not recalling the war. A significant effect also emerges for the number of weekly working hours *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
(b) APEs for the individuals recalling the war are reported in this column, which corresponds to ATET. (c) Correlation coefficient between the errors in the recall war and the labour outcome equations.
(d) 44 individuals who reported more than 72 weekly working hours (99th percentile) are omitted from the estimation sample. Note. The excluded instruments are the casualty rate in the pre-war municipality of residence of the individual and its interactions with ethnicity dummies. All models include the same controls as in the linear models of Table  2 . Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the pre-war municipality of residence level. Income is expressed in Convertible Marks.
in column 2 (where for both unemployment and non-participation hours are set to zero) 33 Table 6 reports the effects estimated with linear IV-GMM. The effects on individual labour market outcomes are generally larger, and amount to -49 p.p. on labour force participation, -23 weekly working hours and -142 KM in monthly wages, and are all statistically significant at the 1% level.
Panel B of
Concluding remarks
War-related violence may have long-lasting effects on an individual's mental health. However, assessing the causal effect of war on mental health is not an easy task given the paucity of high-quality data on individual war victimization and mental health. In this paper, we address this issue by matching the BiH LSMS, which contains a medically validated depression scale (CES-D), with high-quality data on war intensity at the municipality level provided by the Bosnian Book of the Dead. We add to the existing literature on the consequences of the BiH war by focusing on the effect of war trauma, proxied by constantly recalling painful war episodes, on individual mental health.
The IV-GMM estimates suggest that war trauma causes an increase of 16 points (more than one standard deviation) in the CES-D score (i.e., worse mental health) and a 60 p.p. increase in the likelihood of showing depression symptoms (CES-D score greater than 16). Robustness checks indicate that the estimates are robust to a number of issues, such as considering geographical mobility and allowing for different treatment intensities, and that the negative effects on mental health are not mainly mediated by physical health problems. Given that linear IV-GMM provides local estimates (LATE), we also estimated nonlinear models, which provides very similar effects of war trauma on mental health. Using simple back-of-the-envelope calculations, we compute that the war-trauma effect of the war could have been large enough to account for 4.2% of BiH's GDP in 2001.
Our paper points to the existence of large negative effects of war violence on individual mental health, which last several years after the end of the conflict and which are not mediated by other socio-economic stressors (unrelated to war trauma). Policies of reconstruction, investment, and economic recovery, may not be sufficient alone to completely remove the mental health legacy of war, while specifically targeted health programs may be needed for victimized individuals to overcome the psychological distress caused by the conflict. (a) The sample excludes individuals who reported more than 72 weekly working hours (99th percentile). Note. Summary statistics refer to the sample used in Table 2 , and to the sample used in Table 6 only for the Economic outcomes used to compute the costs of war trauma. *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Note. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for recalling the war 'quite a bit' or 'extremely often'. The excluded instruments are the casualty rate in the pre-war municipality of residence of the individual and its interactions with ethnicity dummies. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the pre-war municipality of residence level.
